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INTRODUCTION
Neil Gorsuch was thirteen years old when his mother got a call
from President Ronald Reagan.1 The newly minted Executive asked
her to serve as Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.2 And her tall, studious teen,3 likely caught up in the family’s
excitement, could not have imagined all the ways in which that news
would someday impact his own career. Over three decades later, at
Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing to be an Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court, one of the first critiques of his jurisprudence concerned
1. ANNE BURFORD WITH JOHN GREENYA, ARE YOU TOUGH ENOUGH? 31 (1986) (“[O]n
February 20, 1981, . . . Ronald Reagan caught me in my kitchen and asked me to be the EPA
Administrator.”); Neil Gorsuch Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019 4:07 PM) https://www.cnn
.com/2017/02/03/us/neil-gorsuch-fast-facts/index.html (listing Gorsuch’s birthdate as August
29, 1967).
2. See BURFORD, supra note 1.
3. See Adam Liptak et. al, In Fall of Gorsuch’s Mother, a Painful Lesson in Politick-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court-nominee.html (describing young Neil as “[s]tudious but not standoffish”).
45
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his challenge to a judicial doctrine created at the behest of his mother
during her time leading the EPA.4
Chevron deference, as it is commonly known, was conceived
when Administrator Anne Gorsuch’s EPA redefined “stationary
source” under the Clean Air Act to allow emissions-emitting facilities
to avoid costly state inspections while adding or modifying equipment
on their property.5  After an environmental group challenged the rule,6
the Supreme Court determined that, because the definition of “station-
ary source” under the Clean Air Act was ambiguous,7 the Court was
bound to defer to Administrator Gorsuch’s definition so long as it was
permissible.8  Thus, the Chevron two-step entered the world: if a statu-
tory provision is ambiguous and an agency’s interpretation of that
provision is reasonable, the Court must defer.9
This huge win for the Republican-led EPA, however, was not
without irony. This was most evident after multiple turns between con-
servative and liberal administrations, during which the implications of
Chevron deference had time to fully manifest, when Neil Gorsuch,
nominated like his mother by a Republican President considered a re-
4. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 6 (2017) [hereinafter Justice Gorsuch Hearing] (statement of
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, arguing the Chevron doctrine “has been fundamental to how our
[g]overnment addresses real world challenges in our country and has been in place for de-
cades,” and, “[i]f overturned, as Judge Gorsuch has advocated, legislating rules are very
difficult”).
5. Clean Air Act § 172(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6). See Requirements for Prepara-
tion, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval and Promulgation of
Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50766 (Oct. 14, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51-
52) (summarizing the history of the regulation and the “practical significance” of the change
put forth in the new rule); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (explaining the new EPA rule allows “an existing plant that contains
several pollution-emitting devices [to] install or modify one piece of equipment without
meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions from the
plant . . .  as though [the pollution-emitting devices] were encased within a single ‘bubble’”).
6. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859 (“Respondents place a fundamentally different con-
struction on the statute.”).
7. See id. at 862–63 (concluding the legislative history of the Clean Air Act is “ambig-
uous and like the text of [the statute] itself . . . does not tell us what a new source is, much
less that it is to have an inflexible definition”).
8. See id. at 866 (“We hold that the EPA’s definition of the term ‘source’ is a permissi-
ble construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air
pollution with economic growth.”).
9. See id. at 842–43 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”).
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former,10 was feverishly grilled by Democrat Senators whose gravest
concern, it seemed, was the Tenth Circuit judge’s disdain for Chevron
deference.11 What happened to transform his mother’s win into a cher-
ished precedent for her political opponents? Furthermore, why had
Chevron deference fallen into disfavor with the son of the woman
whom it had benefited?
As if that irony was not enough, on the fourth day of Gorsuch’s
confirmation hearing a Georgetown Law professor highlighted another
dimension. Articulating the single difference between the jurispru-
dence of Gorsuch and the late Justice Antonin Scalia, whom Gorsuch
was to replace, Professor Jonathan Turley said, “the exception . . . is
Chevron.”12 Without time to adequately unpack that statement,
Turley’s words briefly presented a fact to which many conservatives
have yet to fully reconcile themselves: Justice Scalia championed Chev-
ron13—in some of its most extreme forms14—throughout his career.15
10. See Terri Bimes, Ronald Reagan and the New Conservative Populism 11 (Univ.
Cal., Berkley, Inst. of Gov’t Studies, Working Paper No. 2002-1, 2002) (“With Reagan’s con-
vincing victory in the 1980 presidential election, the moment appeared ripe for the triumph
of his brand of conservative populism on the national stage.”); see also Stephen Moore, Wel-
come to the Party of Trump, NATIONAL REVIEW (Dec. 1, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/442605/donald-trumps-republican-party-populist-working-
class-america-first/ (“What roused the ire of some of my conservative friends was my state-
ment that ‘just as Reagan converted the GOP into a conservative party, with his victory this
year, Trump has converted the GOP into a populist, America First party.’”?).
11. Senator Klobuchar stated:
Last year . . . you suggested that Chevron should be overturned, yet this act would
have titanic real world implications on all aspects of our everyday lives. Countless
rules could be in jeopardy, protections that matter to the American people would be
compromised, and there would be widespread uncertainty.
See Justice Gorsuch Hearing, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar);
Senator Al Franken stated:
Just this past August you wrote an opinion in which you suggested that it may be
time to reevaluate what is known as the Chevron doctrine. . . . [T]o those who sub-
scribe to [such an] extreme view, Chevron is the only thing . . . [preventing them
from] gutting any environmental or consumer protection measure that gets in the
way of corporate profit margins.
Id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Franken).
12. Id. at 452 (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley) (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 518 (1989) (“[T]he Chevron approach is correct.”) [hereinafter
Scalia, Judicial Deference]; Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain,
89 GEO L.J. 833, 867 (2001) (referring to Justice Scalia as “Chevron’s chief judicial
champion”).
14. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (holding a court must
defer under Chevron to the FCC’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the
scope of the agency’s statutory authority).
15. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994) (applying the
Chevron framework to deny that a statute governing the FCC was ambiguous and thus
rejecting the agency’s interpretation); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 261 (2001)
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In fact, one might say, if Anne Gorsuch is the de facto mother of Chev-
ron deference, then Scalia is its father.16
Here, then, we arrive at the most important question: what, if
anything, does Justice Gorsuch’s divergence on Chevron from his
mother and predecessor on the bench, both of whom were products of
the Reagan revolution, signal about current trends in conservative
thinking? This Comment seeks to answer that question, but admit-
tedly (and with sincere hope) the attempt may raise more questions
than it answers.
Although Chevron has drawn extensive scholarship examining
its doctrinal origins,17 evolution,18 and impact,19 this is not one of those
inquiries. Instead, this Comment seeks to address some of the circum-
stances and rationale motivating certain people behind Chevron, and
therefore the doctrine and its impact will be discussed in short form.
Accordingly, Part II of this Comment will use Anne Gorsuch’s service
at the EPA as a lens through which to view the conservative revolution
that occurred before and during the Reagan years, with an eye toward
a subtle change in thinking from previous generations regarding
agency regulations. Part III of this Comment will expand on that
change, showing how a parallel shift in jurisprudence, led in part by
Antonin Scalia, enabled the Reagan administration to execute tradi-
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing “vigorously” that Chevron deference should not be limited to
statutes in which Congress has expressly intended that agencies issue interpretations with
the force of law).
16. To be fair, it was technically more of a legitimation. Scalia did not write the Chev-
ron opinion, nor was he even on the court when Chevron was decided. Nevertheless, he
worked to establish the test as a well-oiled doctrine as soon as he was given opportunity.
Furthermore, as will be shown, even Scalia’s academic writings during his time as an ad-
ministrative law professor and opinions while on the D.C. Court of Appeals were
instrumental to Chevron’s genesis. See Merrill, supra note 13, at 838 (“It is difficult to
pinpoint exactly when . . . [Chevron was] recognized as the leading case about deference . . .
but it was almost certainly only after . . . Antonin Scalia[ ] was elevated to the Supreme
Court . . . and made the promotion of Chevron one of his causes.”).
17. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpreta-
tion, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 916–19 (2017) (challenging the traditional understanding of
Chevron’s theoretical origins); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing
at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2013) (arguing the
doctrine of Chevron itself should be unmoored from the Chevron case because of its evolu-
tion through lower court decisions); Merrill, supra note 3, at 835–37 (mapping the scope and
background principles of the Chevron doctrine).
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules
and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 807, 807–09 (2002) (discussing one of Chevron’s
most significant adaptations).
19. See, e.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (2017) (showcasing the largest to-date empirical study of outcomes
when Chevron is applied in Circuit Courts over an eleven year period from 2003–2013).
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tionally conservative policy goals when it would have otherwise been
impeded by the Court. Also, in Part III, this Comment will grapple
with the rationales of the proponents of interpretational deference,
drawing parallels from Roman, English, and American history to bet-
ter understand the arguments within a broad time frame.
Part IV turns at last to Gorsuch’s view of Chevron deference,
probing both his ideological upbringing and his Tenth Circuit jurispru-
dence to understand how his view of interpretational deference differs
from Justice Scalia’s. Finally, Part V draws from Gorsuch’s split with
Justice Scalia over Chevron to contemplate reasons for the current
trend among many conservatives to disfavor the doctrine, namely its
frustration of due process, harm to small business, and disruption of
the tripartite balance of power. To close, this Comment argues that,
should Chevron fall, strictly de novo judicial review of agency interpre-
tations of law may ultimately force Congress to reconsider the
quantum of power delegated to agencies.
I. ANNE GORSUCH: CAREER & IDEOLOGY
Viewing the brief political moment of the late 1970s and early
1980s through the lens of one of its key figures—Anne Gorsuch—
shows that economic expediency and political momentum led conserva-
tives to sacrifice dearly held constitutional values for economic success.
A. Mother, Leader, “Crazy”
Anne Gorsuch had three children under the age of ten when she
ran for a seat in the 1976 Colorado State Legislature.20 Neil, her oldest
at nine, joined his mom on the campaign trail, knocking on doors to ask
for support and rubbing elbows with the who’s-who at a Governor’s
party.21 Her victory that year was remarkable, not just because she
was a young mother of three in an era when politicians were over-
whelmingly middle-to-late-aged men, but because she unseated an
entrenched Democrat incumbent as a Republican in a Democrat-laden
district.22
20. John Frank & Mark K. Matthews, Neil Gorsuch Revives His Mother’s Political Leg-
acy in Colorado, THE DENV. POST (Mar. 20, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/
2017/03/19/neil-gorsuch-anne-burford-colorado/.
21. Id.
22. See BURFORD, supra note 1, at 13 (describing Anne’s East Denver district political R
climate as 40% Democrat, 19% Republican, the rest independent, and having a Democrat
incumbent who “had been in office for two terms and was on . . . a very powerful
committee”).
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Anne’s win marked a successful shift in Republican political
strategy nationwide. In 1975, at the exact nadir of Republican politics
in America,23 Bill Brock, the Chairman of the Republican National
Committee who later served as Reagan’s Secretary of Labor, imple-
mented a grassroots scheme to rebuild the Republican party “from the
courthouse up, not the White House down,” by systematically tapping
“ideal candidates” to oppose Democratic incumbents across the coun-
try.24  Anne was one of those special few who got a call, and she happily
joined the RNC’s efforts.25
The emerging political strategy in conservative circles signaled
the beginning of a parallel change in governance strategy that would
not be fully realized until Reagan took office.  The traditional stance of
conservatives has been to rally against the exercise of state power. Be-
ginning in the early 1980s, however, conservatives began to embrace
state power as a means to achieve policy aims, most notably the der-
egulation of the economy. Recently, Erik Erlandson aptly termed this
strategic shift as “administrative deregulation,” which he describes as
occurring when “bureaucratic autonomy” (an administrator’s power “to
make decisions free from [the] external control . . . [of] other branches
of government”) grows and is used to decrease “administrative capac-
ity” (the size and scope of that agency’s ability to “regulate private
conduct”).26 In essence, administrative deregulation is the “paradoxical
situation[ ] when the state is empowered to undermine the state.”27
Administrative deregulation was in embryonic form in 1976
when the new crop of Republicans won a sweeping victory in both of
Colorado’s legislative chambers. Without wasting a moment, they be-
gan using their newfound power to “carry out a conservative agenda.”28
They replaced the “incumbent Republican” speaker of the house with a
“conservative Republican,” and then went on to repeal five taxes, re-
form regulatory measures, and “limit the growth of state
government.”29 They were using the legislative power of the people to
23. See Tim Storey, 2004 Legislative Elections, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2005 108
(Council of State Gov’t ed., 37th ed. 2005) (displaying a chart of legislative seats won by
Democrats and Republicans from 1938 to 2004).
24. BURFORD, supra note 1, at 12. R
25. See id. (“I certainly would not have run if they hadn’t come to me and said they
thought I could do so and win.”).
26. Erik M. Erlandson, A Technocratic Free Market: How Courts Paved the Way for
Administered Deregulation in the American Financial Sector, 1977–1988, 29 J. OF POL’Y
HIST. 350, 352 (2017).
27. Id.
28. BURFORD, supra note 1, at 15. R
29. Id. at 15, 16.
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target and eliminate hindrances to the economy, and the liberal press
did not like it. Soon the conservative core of the House earned a pejora-
tive moniker that would stick with many of them for the remainder of
their careers: the “House Crazies.”30
Anne Gorsuch—who had earned her juris doctor from Colorado
Law at twenty-years-old and passed the bar at twenty-one, had won a
Fulbright scholarship to India, and had spent several years as a corpo-
rate attorney31—was informally dubbed the “legal brains of the
outfit.”32  In her first year alone, she introduced and carried twenty-six
bills, earning her an award as the “Outstanding Freshman Legisla-
tor.”33  Initial success led to greater responsibility, and during her
second term she was made head of the State Affairs Committee, where
she was instrumental in tackling the toughest legal questions facing
the House.34  Thus, it can be said of Anne that she was at the exact
epicenter of the shifting Republican governance strategy, and in many
ways was driving it.
B. “Mafia” Member
“We did ‘Reaganism’ in the Colorado legislature before Reagan
did it,” Anne claimed in her memoir written a few years after she re-
signed from the EPA, referring to their efforts to limit the size of the
Colorado state government.35  But without decades of hindsight to
parse the ideological mechanics of her generation’s movement, Anne
was unable to recognize that her claim was only partly true.  “Reagan-
ism,” as it was later made fully manifest, involved not mere legislative
efforts, but also (and perhaps primarily) administrative efforts to der-
egulate the economy.36
Viewed differently, however, Anne’s boast about doing Reagan-
ism “in the Colorado legislature” was truer than she meant it to be.
When Reagan was elected, he nominated two Colorado Republicans to
take key cabinet positions: James Watt as the Secretary of the Interior
30. Id. at 16. See also Frank & Matthews, supra note 20 (noting that the label came “as
a badge of honor for how they upset the moderate Republican tradition and pushed an ag-
gressive agenda to lower taxes and cut government regulations”).
31. Frank & Matthews, supra note 20.
32. BURFORD, supra note 1, at 16. R
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id. (explaining that “[t]raditionally . . . anything that was problematic, from either
a legal or a political point of view, went to State Affairs”).
35. Id. at 17.
36. See Erlandson, supra note 26, at 369 (citing Professor Jide Nzelibe’s opinion that
“officials in the Reagan Administration . . . steer[ed] the state in a deregulatory direction”).
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and Anne Gorsuch as the head of the EPA.37 Furthermore, slews of
Coloradan legislators were given critical roles in the administration,
sometimes as supporting cast for agency heads in D.C., and other times
as regional directors of administrative programs.38 The nominations of
Watt and Anne to the Interior and the EPA are especially noteworthy
because of the prominent role each of those agencies played in Rea-
gan’s deregulatory goals. The Department of the Interior works
strategically with nearly every agency in the Federal government, and
the EPA was targeted by Reagan for a radical regulatory overhaul.39
Thus, the “conservatism” that had been the boast of the House Crazies
as legislators became “Reaganism” when many of those same people
became federal administrators.
Of the many ways in which this change was remarkable, the
most striking feature was its subtlety. Without giving a passing
thought to the overarching implications a conservative legislative
strategy would bear when implemented from within the nation’s execu-
tive branch, Anne and company, in their new administrative posts,
went straight to work just as they had in ‘76. In her opening statement
at her confirmation hearing, Anne explained precisely what that work
would come to look like:
The President is committed to regulatory reform, and here I believe
it is important to emphasize that the reform is not limited to with-
drawal of unnecessary or overly burdensome singular regulations,
but envisions a much broader scope involving the process by which
new regulations are formulated and current regulations
evaluated. . . .40
In other words, instead of using traditional means to deregulate—by
pushing legislation to unwind “unnecessary or overly burdensome sin-
gular regulations”—Reaganism seeks to use the power of agencies to
alter the “process” of regulatory schemes in order to “reform” (i.e. miti-
gate) the power of the state.  Here, Erlandson’s administrative
37. William E. Schmidt, The ‘Colorado Mafia’ Puts Its Stamp on the Government, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1981, at 4004005.
38. Id. (explaining the influence of Joseph Coors, a wealthy Coloradan businessman
and personal friend of Reagan’s, on placing Coloradans in the President’s administration).
See also KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVE-
MENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN (2009), for a detailed look at the influence of wealthy
businessmen on conservative politics during the twentieth century.
39. Philip Shabecoff, Reagan and Environment: To Many, a Stalemate, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/02/us/reagan-and-environment-to-many-a-
stalemate.html (describing Reagan’s appointment of Watt and Burford as indicative of his
intent to make “the nation’s environmental policies . . . a prime target of his social
revolution”).
40. BURFORD, supra note 1, at 54. R
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deregulation fully emerges: the state seeks for itself power to limit its
own capacity.41 Under Reagan, then, the conservatism that had once
been a legislative agenda was, at least in part, transformed into execu-
tive prerogative.
Tellingly, whereas Anne and her Coloradan compatriots previ-
ously earned a label questioning their sanity—“Crazies”—as federal
agents they were given a new nickname that emphasized their inde-
pendence and organizational power: the “Colorado Mafia.”42 For Anne,
using the power of the EPA to constrict the EPA was a logical progres-
sion in her career:
[M]y dealings with EPA as a state legislator had taught me that the
head of EPA has more unfettered power than anybody else in town.
I don’t care if you’re Secretary of Defense. The Administrator of
EPA has more discretionary power (all of which, incidentally, had
come from Congress), which means someone could get in there and
really do a job.43
Here again, the subtlety and ease of conscience are noteworthy. Anne
fully acknowledged that the “discretionary power” which had “come
from Congress” was a means to “really do a job,” that is, limit the ca-
pacity of the EPA itself.44 But rather than question the
constitutionality of such power, she embraced it as primary motivation
in leading the EPA.
C. Administrator
Once at the EPA, Anne quickly set Reaganism into play. Much
to her advantage, the previous administration left many statutory obli-
gations unfulfilled due to organizational incompetence,45 giving the
highly disciplined Anne an opportunity to fill the gaps.46
41. See Erlandson, supra note 26.
42. Schmidt, supra note 37.
43. BURFORD, supra note 1, at 9–10. R
44. Id.
45. See BURFORD, supra note 1, at 69 (“After I’d studied [a chart displaying the previ- R
ous administration’s organizational authority] briefly I could see only too clearly that using
the ‘system’ represented by this chart one could never make any decisions!”).
46. See id. at 99 (“They had left us more power than we deserved, because they left
agendas of inaction that we filled. What we inherited from them was a legacy of inaction, of
decisional voids. We started filling those voids. And they could see all of those substantive
areas slipping away from them. I will bet that we produced more regulations in the twenty-
two months of my tenure than were produced in the entire four years under President
Carter.”).
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Substantively, Anne’s critique of the previous administration
was that they had “strayed from . . . legislative intent.”47 In theory, the
EPA was supposed to set a national standard, outline a general frame-
work for state compliance, and then approve each state’s
individualized plans.48  But instead, in every major program, the
Carter EPA had denied states authority to implement programs unless
they adopted “specific EPA regulations.”49 In other words, Anne
faulted the previous administration for making the EPA’s capacity as a
rule maker larger and more domineering than Congress originally
envisioned.
A perfect example of this problem, and how Anne practiced ad-
ministrative deregulation to fix it, is seen in the regulation that
ultimately led to the Chevron litigation.  Part of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977 required states to “establish a permit program
regulating ‘new or modified major stationary sources’ of air pollu-
tion.”50 Because “stationary source” was ambiguous under the
language of the statute, the EPA was tasked with defining the term.
In 1980, the Carter EPA decided that, in areas where the emis-
sions standards had not yet been achieved (“nonattainment” areas),
“stationary source” would be defined as each “installation” within a
plant—that is, each smoke stack.51 Because a permit would be re-
quired for each stationary source, the finite definition of each
“installation” would drastically increase the red tape and costs neces-
sary to expand or build a plant. Furthermore, this definition would
apply even to states whose implementation plans were otherwise ap-
provable—i.e. the Carter EPA withheld approval of state programs
unless they adopted the EPA’s specific definition of statutory source.52
Anne’s EPA had a different approach.53 In 1981, she approved a
regulation that redefined “stationary source” under the 1977 Clean Air
47. Id. at 65.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837, 840 (1984).
51. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,680
(Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 124) [hereinafter Requirements for
IP, Volume 45].
52. See id.; see also BURFORD, supra note 1, at 66 (noting the Carter EPA had left office R
with two thousand state implementation plans unapproved, the “most recent of which was
eighteen months old”).
53. It should be conceded here that the proposal to change the definition of stationary
source for nonattainment areas to one encompassing an entire plant was initiated just prior
to Anne Gorsuch’s tenure but during Reagan’s presidency. See generally Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulga-
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\13-1\FAM103.txt unknown Seq: 11  7-AUG-19 14:36
2017 AGENCY POWER 55
Act Amendments to denote an entire “plant.”54 This definition, known
as the “bubble concept,”55 allowed plants to expand, modify, or add new
pollution-emitting devices without going through the trouble of seeking
a new permit, regardless of whether or not they operated in a nonat-
tainment area. In other words, Anne’s EPA chose to mitigate the
invasion of the state into the economy, and they did so by exercising
rulemaking power.
II. THE CHEVRON STORY: FROM JAMES I, THROUGH ANNE, BY SCALIA
Anne Gorsuch’s decision to change the definition of “stationary
source” under the Clean Air Act met immediate opposition.  The press
hated it,56 environmentalists abhorred it,57 and before long the EPA
was in court defending it.58  Here, then, it became apparent that for the
administrative deregulation of Reaganism to work, it needed help from
the third branch of government. Cue Chevron.
But first, to fully appreciate the judicial mechanics that enabled
administrative deregulation to operate, it is helpful to briefly consider
Chevron within a broad historical context—as a curious but decisive
step in a very long argument between proponents of state power and
proponents of the rule of law.
Also, as a foundation, it is important to establish a few terms.
First, “law,” at least in this discussion, implies a Lockean social con-
tract among the people conferring governing authority to a body of
representatives.59  Second, “extralegal” power, as Philip Hamburger
tion of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280 (Mar. 12, 1981) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51 and 52). Nevertheless, this is irrelevant because Anne Gorsuch enthusiasti-
cally approved the plan as Administrator. See BURFORD, supra note 1, at 67 (describing her R
astonishment that the Carter EPA had not adopted the “simple” bubble concept for the
Clean Air Act).
54. See Requirements for IP, Volume 45, supra note 51 at 50,766.
55. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855-57.
56. See, e.g., Eva Hoffman & Margot Slade, Ideas & Trends; More Pollution ‘Bubbles’?,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/04/weekinreview/ideas-trends-
more-pollution-bubbles.html (describing the EPA as “undaunted” in the face of criticism
from environmental groups and its bubble policy as “controversial”).
57. Id. (quoting “David Hawkins, a senior attorney for the Natural Resources Defense
Council, [who] said the policy would lead to ‘delays in cleaning up the air’“).
58. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub
nom. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Connecticut
Fund for the Env’t v. EPA, 696 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 23 (2014) (explaining
that “Lockean reasoning about consent” shows that “legal obligation rests on consent and
that binding laws have to be made by the society’s representative legislature”); see also FOR-
REST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 65 (1985) (discussing Locke’s theory of consent).
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has used the term recently, means binding power derived “outside of
the law.”60  Extralegal power is not conferred by a society, but assumed
by a ruler “independent or apart from the law.”61  An illustration of
extralegal power would be a basketball referee who decides to prohibit
dribbling in the middle of a game.  Because the players had consented
to a set of rules ahead of the game which allowed dribbling, the refe-
ree’s amendment, without player approval, is independent of their
consent, and therefore extralegal.
Third, to justify extralegal power, rulers throughout history
have relied on “supralegal” authority.62  Supralegal authority is that
which is “above the law,” meaning “not accountable” to the consent of
the governed.63  Thus, if an exertion of extralegal power is derived from
supralegal authority, it cannot by definition have violated the law.64
Accordingly, supralegal power stands in direct “contrast to ideas about
the supremacy of the law.”65  This supralegal power has often been
based on the concept of “necessity.”66  As applied to the basketball
analogy, should the referee choose to assert that his “no dribbling” rule
derived from, in his opinion, the need for more passing, he would be
deferring to a type of supralegal authority.
Of course, it is easy to observe from this simple illustration that
the need for more passing was decided by the referee alone, and thus
extralegal power exercised by supralegal authority is really an over-
wrought way to define “absolute” power.67  This is especially true
when, as in the basketball-referee analogy, the rulemaking occurs in a
“consolidated” body.68  One referee makes a binding rule on all players
based on his conception of the need for more passing.  Because no per-
son affected by the referee’s decision has contributed to the rule, his
power is absolute.
Lastly, “state power,” as it will be discussed here, is not neces-
sarily extralegal, supralegal, or absolute, but it contains both the
potential and propensity to be those things if not sufficiently con-
strained by the rule of law.  This is because “state power,” as it is used
here, means the execution of laws.  To return one last time to the bas-
60. HAMBURGER, supra note 59, at 21.
61. Id.




66.  HAMBURGER, supra note 59, at 24.
67. See id. (“The traditional label for extra- or supralegal mode of governance was ‘ab-
solute power.’”).
68. See id. at 25.
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ketball analogy, every whistle blow of the referee is “state power.”
Whether or not he chooses to limit himself to the predetermined rules,
however, is uncertain.
A. The Road to Chevron
In Rome, the large common market that facilitated unprece-
dented human flourishing eventually crumbled under the weight of an
expansive state bureaucracy.69 Over the course of five centuries, “[t]he
steady encroachment of the state into the intimate workings of the
economy eroded growth[, resulting in] . . . increasing feudalization of
the economy and a total breakdown of the division of labor.”70 Ulti-
mately, the collapse of the Western Empire can be attributed to an
“economic deterioration resulting from excessive taxation, inflation,
and over-regulation.”71
This bit of world history was not lost on the English Courts and
Parliament during the reign of King James I in the early seventeenth
century.72 By championing the rule of law, England had emerged from
an arduous climb out of the Dark and Middle Ages when feudalism had
dominated the European continent.73 Therefore, when English
monarchs like Henry VIII and James I began claiming “prerogative
power,” a type of extralegal and supralegal power nearly identical to
Roman “imperial” power and, later, American “administrative” power,
Parliament and the English Courts fought back in order to wrangle the
king’s absolute rule.74 In fact, “the English adopted ideas about an En-
69. See Bruce Bartlett, How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome, 14 CATO J.
287, 292-301 (1994) (reviewing five centuries of Roman regulations, taxation, and monetary
policy that led to feudalism, diminished military capacity, and the ruinous Barbarian
invasions).
70. Id. at 297.
71. Id. at 301.
72. HAMBURGER, supra note 59, at 51–52 (showing the popularity of Roman legal con-
cepts among English leaders).
73. See id. at 26 (“Throughout the medieval . . . era[ ], European rulers pressed for
absolute power. . . . The English . . . in the Middle Ages, repeatedly enacted statutes at-
tempting to restore governance through and under the law . . . .”); see also ADAM SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 425 (Edwin Cannan ed. 1994) (“The ancient policy of Europe was . . .
[unfavorable] to the improvement and cultivation of land . . . first, by general prohibition of
the exportation of corn without a special [license], which seems to have been a very univer-
sal regulation; and secondly, by the restraints which were laid upon the inland commerce
. . . .”).
74. See HAMBURGER, supra note 59, at 26 (“Anglo-American law has a history of an
extra- and supralegal power in what was known as the ‘prerogative.’ This was the name of
the power claimed by English kings, and it corresponds to the administrative power claimed
by the president [of the United States of America] or under his authority.”); Id. at 51. (“At
the same time that James I attempted to legislate through his proclamations, he and his
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glish constitution precisely in order to make clear that there could be
no binding or constraining government power outside or above the
law.”75
The adoption of a constitution as a means to preclude extralegal
and supralegal governance became the hallmark of America’s found-
ing.76 The Founders had grown up in an era marred by the effects of
concessions Parliament had made to allow monarchs to rule differently
in the colonies than in the motherland. In England, the monarch’s pre-
rogative power had been significantly constrained, but in the colonies
he was emboldened to rule arbitrarily and encroach natural rights of
his constituents.77 After the Revolution, “Americans aimed to establish
governments in which a governor or president had ‘the whole executive
power, after divesting it of those badges of domination called preroga-
tives.’ ”78 Accordingly, they constructed the Constitution with
“principles of constitutional administrative power,” including “law-
making by elected representatives, unity and responsibility in the
executive, the separation of powers, and judicial review of administra-
tive action.”79 These four pillars were essential to the Founders to
preclude corresponding absolute powers of the state: lawmaking by the
executive, dispersion of executive power and responsibility among mul-
tiple executives, consolidation of power in one branch of government,
and judicial deference.
prerogative courts also asserted a power to interpret statutes in a manner that amounted to
lawmaking. Drawing on imperial Roman ideas, they claimed a prerogative to fill the gaps in
statutes and insisted that the law courts had to defer to such ‘interpretation.’ . . . [T]he
Roman foundations of their lawmaking . . . suggests the imperial and absolute character of
such interpretation and the sobering implications of its administrative rival.”).
75. Id. at 28.
76. See id. at 32 (“[T]he Constitution’s grant of legislative power to Congress developed
not only to authorize and control the acts of the legislature, but also to bar any prerogative
or other extralegal legislative acts.”).
77.  See JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S
CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 9 (2017) (“American colonists grappled with
administrative bodies constructed by the Crown to manage their internal affairs.”); see also
HAMBURGER, supra note 59, at 26 (discussing the triumphs of the English over absolute
power and noting that “[o]n the Continent . . . absolute power . . . was a continuing element
of Continental governance.”). See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
78. HAMBURGER, supra note 59, at 28 (quoting John Adams). See also POSTELL, supra
note 77, at 30 (“[M]any of the debates at the Convention and during the ratification of the
Constitution . . . [focused on] how to reconcile administration with American constitutional-
ism.”); see also id. at 31 (“[F]ear of executive power made them hesitate [on establishing a
single Executive].”); see also id. at 33 (“Madison[ ] . . . shows a clear and conclusive commit-
ment to the principle of nondelegation: that the legislature may not transfer legislative or
judicial power over to the executive.”).
79. POSTELL, supra note 77, at 9.
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By the twentieth century, however, after a Civil War that re-
shaped the nation’s sociological paradigm and an industrial revolution
that reorganized the world’s socioeconomic landscape, the Founders’
core impetuses had faded from memory or relevance, and American
thought leaders began reconsidering the nation’s fundamental tripar-
tite structure to address the problems of the times.80 Although there
was broad disagreement over what new model was appropriate or how
it should be superimposed over the Constitution,81 the intellectual and
political debates finally culminated in the New Deal.82 Accordingly,
President Roosevelt pushed policies that sought to regulate by making
“trusts and monopolies . . . subservient to the state through centralized
commissions . . . .”83 In other words, the New Deal created modern
agencies, with all their power and capacity to set standards in various
industries.
However successful they were at resolving the problems they
perceived as stemming from America’s tripartite structure, these twen-
tieth-century reformers left many questions unanswered, and “[t]he
tension between the basic principles of American constitutionalism
and the modern administrative state would lead to a series of constitu-
tional crises that reformers would have to confront later.”84 By the
1960’s and 1970’s, liberals began noticing two primary problems with
the administrative state: agency capture and the politicization of the
agencies.85 These two issues perverted core goals of the Progressives
80. See id. at 174 (“Many Progressives vehemently criticized the idea that the Consti-
tution mandated a strong separation of powers. Modern government, they claimed,
necessitated the combination of certain functions and a straightjacket understanding of the
separation of powers would render government incapable of meeting modern needs.”).
81. See generally id. at 199 (contrasting two major theories of early twentieth century
progressivism: the “New Freedom” and the “New Nationalism.”).
82. See id. at 215 (““Franklin Roosevelt’s closest advisors . . . argued that the New Deal
should be premised on a conception of ‘government as a profoundly prescriptive entity. Ex-
perts would formulate policy, agencies would implement it, and the courts would stay out of
the way.’ These thinkers ‘rejected any role for the courts in the policymaking process.’”); id.
at 231 (“[Roscoe] Pound . . . argued that nothing short of regime change was occurring in the
New Deal. . . . In turning to administrative absolutism, Pound concluded, the New Deal was
taking America in the direction of Russia.”) (citing Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331, 343 (1938)).
83.  POSTELL, supra note 77, at 199.
84. Id. at 206.
85. See id. at 251 (“[Capture occurs when] the agency develops expertise, often drawn
from experience working in the same firms the agency is supposed to oversee, [and] ‘[t]he
commission becomes accepted as an essential part of the industrial system,’ working along-
side the industry itself. It sees its task as helping to manage the industry, for the
betterment of the regulated, rather than the public interest with which the agency interacts
only minimally.”); see also id. (“[Politicization occurs when] a chief executive . . . use[s] the
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who had established the New Deal—independence and expertise86—
and led liberals to rethink the purposes of the administrative state.
Now, liberals desired to use the administrative state to “serve funda-
mental values that lie beyond the facts and calculations of
administrators.”87 Accordingly, liberal politicians and judges imple-
mented changes to standing and judicial review norms, thereby
democratizing the administrative state by giving advocacy groups and
courts a greater role in keeping agencies accountable.88
B. How to Deal with a Behemoth: A Bigger Behemoth?
To conservatives, the aggrandizement of the judiciary and em-
powerment of advocacy groups presented two main problems. First,
this meant their beloved industries would continue struggling
against—in their view—meddlesome regulations. Second, the enlarge-
ment of the judicial branch presented its own separation-of-powers
issues by shifting lawmaking power even further away from the citi-
zens—that is, a democratically represented majority in Congress. In
response, a new wave of conservative jurisprudential leaders sought to
right these wrongs by, paradoxically, aligning themselves with their
old New Deal foes and pushing for greater judicial deference to agency
action.
Accordingly, the two-party system of “conservatives” and “liber-
als” in the 1980s abandoned the classic “binary” among them. As
Erikson explains:
Embedded in the language of politics and also in historical scholar-
ship is a division between liberals who use the state and
conservatives who eschew government and instead prefer market-
based policy solutions. [Administrative deregulation] shatters that
binary, demonstrating that conservatives covet a certain kind of bu-
reaucratic power. While they oppose government intervention in
administrative hierarchy to frustrate, rather than to achieve, the ends that the modern ad-
ministrative state was authorized to attain.”).
86. See e.g. id. at 250 (“Progressives rooted their faith in administrative expertise in
the view that regulatory policy questions had an objectively right answer.”).
87. Id. at 251; see also Erlandson, supra note 26, at 356–57 (discussing the shift in
liberal thought toward administrative agencies from their Progressive predecessors).
88. See POSTELL, supra note 77, at 260 (“As courts began to be viewed more favorably
by those on the left, in light of the growing distrust of agencies, liberals began to push for
laxer standing thresholds, allowing more interest groups to influence the administrative
process through courts sympathetic to their purposes. This development . . . was a shift
away from the earlier Progressive approach that called for judicial deference to agencies
. . . .”); see also id. at 265 (“As a result [of agency capture and the politicization of agencies],
judicial review of agency legal interpretation and policymaking discretion became more
searching, expanding judicial intervention further.”).
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economic activity, they support the insulation and autonomy of gov-
ernment agencies to dismantle those interventions. The story of . . .
Chevron shows that federal regulators, though often portrayed as
inimical to conservative ideological objectives, have actually been
instrumental in advancing [conservative] deregulatory policies. Be-
neath . . . antistatist rhetoric—“OSHA is a four-letter word,”
“Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the
problem”—lie the realities of the modern administrative state,
which . . . belie the partisan tropes that saturate our discourse.89
In particular, one conservative administrative law professor be-
gan pushing for judicial deference to agency interpretations as a means
to dramatically change the manner in which conservatives govern:
Antonin Scalia. Scalia’s decision to advocate for judicial deference
stemmed from an epiphany of Attorney General William Saxbe, who
had once heard during a conversation at a cocktail party that “[t]he
basic difference between the [political] parties is quite simple: The
Democrats want to run the country, and the Republicans don’t want
them to.”90 Scalia, who had previously worked for the Attorney Gen-
eral, termed this insight the “Saxbe Hypothesis,” describing it as:
[T]he proposition that the basic goal of the Republican party is not
to govern, but to prevent the Democrats from doing so. It is applica-
ble, of course, not merely to Republicans but more generally to all
those who seek to reverse the trend of increasing government con-
trol over economic and social affairs. Distrustful of government in
general and executive government in particular, they are not only
less eager than their political opponents to grasp the levers of gov-
ernment power but are also inclined to view all impediments to the
exercise of that power as a victory for their cause.91
To change this, Scalia believed Republicans needed to realize
“the accursed ‘unelected officials’ downtown are now their unelected of-
ficials, presumably seeking to move things in their desired direction;
and that every curtailment of desirable agency discretion obstructs
(principally) departure from a Democrat-produced, pro-regulatory sta-
tus quo.”92 In other words, conservative Congressmen needed to get in
line with Reaganism and embrace administrative deregulation by es-
chewing legislation that would limit the power of agencies.
Most important to Scalia, however, was the discretion afforded
by the judiciary to regulators. In 1981 and 1982, when Congress was
89. Erlandson, supra note 26, at 352–53 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
90. Antonin Scalia, Regulatory Reform—The Game Has Changed, 5 REGULATION 13, 13
(1981) [hereinafter “Scalia, Regulatory Reform”].
91. Id.
92. Id.
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considering a statute that would curtail deference to agencies, Scalia
railed against it, and stated “Why a conservative Republican Senate
would want thus to increase the power of the overwhelmingly liberal
life-tenured judiciary appointed [during the Carter administration] is
beyond me. . . . [T]here is little in this bill which should have much
appeal to the executive branch.”93 Not surprisingly, within the same
year of publishing these thoughts, he was tapped by Reagan to fill a
vacancy on the administrative law-heavy D.C. Circuit.
As a judge, Scalia wasted no time to push for judicial deference
to agency interpretations of law. In a case that predated Chevron by
eighteen months, Scalia wrote:
The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the term
“owner” was used by Congress in a sense that was meant to refer to
a well-established legal definition or series of legal precedents, in
which case we should not defer to the agency’s interpretation; or
rather in a sense that was meant to be informed by the nature and
purpose of the statutory scheme which the Commission is charged
with elaborating.
. . .
Our task, then, is to determine whether the Commission’s interpre-
tation of the word “owner” is so unreasonable as to go beyond the
bounds of interpretive discretion which Congress evidently
afforded.94
In other words, if the statute is unambiguous as to the meaning of a
word, no deference is given. But if it is ambiguous, the court assumes
Congress has “charged” the agency to elaborate.  This latter conse-
quence is significant because it tacitly sanctions Congress to
intentionally create ambiguity for an executive agency to fill—that is,
Congress may delegate not only the authority to execute a statute, but
also, in certain respects, help write it. To verify this type of delegation
had occurred, Scalia then searched the legislative history for evidence
of Congress’s implicit desire for the term to be defined by the Commis-
sion.95 Thus, Scalia displayed a willingness to sacrifice his own
interpretational dogma in order to provide judicial deference to admin-
93. Antonin Scalia, Regulatory Review and Management, 6 REGULATION 19, 21 (1982).
See Scalia, Regulatory Reform, supra note 90, at 13 (arguing against the “Bumper” amend-
ment that would mandate judicial deference to agencies).
94. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (1983) (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 1148 (“The highly flexible nature of the term, and the subordination of
rigid legalities to the overall purpose of the provision is amply demonstrated by the discus-
sion in the House Report.”).
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istrative interpretations of law.96 Further, and more importantly, he
clearly articulated his preeminent justification for doing so: congres-
sional intent to delegate.
Scalia’s deference to agencies on matters of law aligned exactly
with proponents of the New Deal.97 Scalia’s justifications for deference,
however, differed from theirs.  President Franklin Roosevelt’s closest
advisors argued for deference based on a “conception of ‘government
. . .[where] experts . . . formulate policy, agencies . . . implement it, and
courts . . . stay out of the way.’”98 But Scalia discarded the expertise
argument, calling it “a good practical reason for accepting the agency’s
views, but hardly a valid theoretical justification for doing so.”99 Un-
surprisingly, Scalia was too moored to the “deep-rooted feeling that it
is the judges who must say what the law is” to allow an agency’s “rela-
tive competence” to override Justice Marshall’s supreme constitutional
command.100
For Scalia, the reason to defer to agency determinations of law
was built upon Congress’s intent to leave the “resolution [of the legal
question] to the agency.”101 Discerning a “conferral of discretion upon
the agency,” however, had proven laborious for judges in the past,102
and therefore Scalia celebrated the monumental leap taken in Chevron
to replace “statute by statute evaluation” with “an across the board
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is
meant.”103 This “rational presumption” allows courts to avoid the “wild
goose chase” for genuine legislative intent; “[i]n the vast majority of
cases [Scalia] expect[ed] that Congress neither (1) intended a single re-
sult, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3)
didn’t think about the matter at all.”104 Accordingly, “any rule adopted
96. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 34 (1997) (“[T]he more courts have relied upon legislative history, the less worthy of
reliance it has become.”).
97. See POSTELL, supra note 77, at 214 (“Progressives . . . sought to restrict the scope of
judicial review across the board, including review of agency interpretations of law.”).
98. Id. at 215.
99. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 514.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 516.
102. See id. (“As I read the history of developments in this field, the pre-Chevron deci-
sions sought to [discern Congress’s intent to confer discretion] on a statute-by-statute basis.
Hence the relevance of such frequently mentioned factors as the degree of the agency’s ex-
pertise, the complexity of the question at issue, and the existence of rulemaking authority
within the agency. All these factors make an intent to confer discretion upon the agency
more likely.”).
103. Id.
104. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 516–17.
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in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and oper-
ates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress
can legislate.”105
Making Congress’s job easier, then, was the ultimate goal.106
And although helping Congress in this way comes with “certain conse-
quences,” Scalia was more than ready to accept them.107 Namely,
because this justification abandons the concept of experts searching for
the “one, permanent, ‘correct’ meaning of the statute” for a concept of
legislative convenience, “the agency is free to give the statute which-
ever of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive to
accomplishment of the statutory purpose.”108  In other words: the fit-
ness of laws is no longer preeminent so long as the institution that
created them makes Congress’s task more predictable. Furthermore,
this necessarily means “there is no apparent justification for holding
the agency to its first answer, or penalizing it for a change of mind.”109
Even if an agency’s rule is inconsistent with prior interpretations, the
Court should acquiesce.
C. Chevron & the EPA
This latter consequence of judicial deference to agency interpre-
tations of law would have been important to Anne Gorsuch and the
EPA when they defended their “bubble concept” at the D.C. Circuit.
Had Judge Scalia drawn the case, perhaps the issue would have been
settled at the appellate level and Chevron, as it is now known, would
not exist. Instead, one of the “judges recently appointed by Jimmy
Carter” about whom Scalia had warned,110 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, pre-
sided over National Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch.111
105. Id. at 517.
106. See id. (“Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally
or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by
the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 517.
110. Scalia, Regulatory Reform, supra note 90, at 13–14.
111. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In spite of this
comment, Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg went on to have a very close friendship dur-
ing their tenure together on the highest court. See, e.g., David G. Savage, BFFs Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia Agree to Disagree, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2015, 3:00 AM) http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-na-court-odd-couple-20150622-story.html.
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In a holding that paralleled much of the liberal jurisprudence
over agency discretion of the 1960s and 1970s,112 Judge Ginsburg shot
down the EPA’s extension of the “bubble concept” to nonattainment ar-
eas. Relying on precedents where the reviewing courts “focused on the
purpose Congress envisioned for the particular program at issue,”
Ginsburg held that “EPA’s regulatory change, its employment of the
bubble concept to shrink to relatively small size mandatory new source
review in nonattainment areas, is impermissible.”113
In spite of the loss at the D.C. Circuit, the EPA remained un-
daunted. In its Reply Brief on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
government asserted (through Solicitor General Rex Lee) that the case
was “one for the application of the conventional rule of administrative
law that a court should defer to the agency’s view of its own authority
under a statute committed to it for enforcement.”114 Until Chevron,
however, even Scalia admitted that there had been nothing conven-
tional about judicial deference to agency interpretations of law; rather,
the Court had “two lines of . . . decisions on this subject which [were]
analytically in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals must
choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand.”115 On
one hand, the Supreme Court had afforded “great deference” to agen-
cies in applying statutes.116 On the other, the Supreme Court had
sanctioned “free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment
when the question involve[d] the meaning of a statutory term.”117
In Chevron, then, the Court definitively chose the path of defer-
ence. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, appeared to accept out-of-
hand the government’s claim that deference was conventional, stating
matter-of-factly that, where statutory ambiguity exists, “the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . .”118 Here, at
the end of this exact line, without disrupting the seemingly innocent
confidence of his tone, Stevens dropped a curious footnote: “See gener-
112. See POSTELL, supra note 77, at 279 (“[C]ourts [in the 1960’s and 70’s] . . . became
more active in countering the unchecked administrative power that Progressives and New
Dealers had constructed . . . .”).
113. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 720.
114. Reply Brief for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247,
and 82-1591), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 51, at *23 (emphasis added).
115. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 513 (quoting Judge Henry Friendly in
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff’d sub nom.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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ally R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 174–75 (1921).”119 At
first glance, the reference appears to be an innocuous, routine example
of what Stevens was not doing, meant only for clarification. The ex-
cerpt from Roscoe Pound’s book asserts, inter alia, that “the courts . . .
must to some extent make the law under the guise of interpretation”
when a statute is ambiguous.120 But students of the New Deal era im-
mediately understand why Stevens’ selection of Pound—not a myriad
other sources or cases, such as the lower court’s opinion—as a counter
example is significant: Pound posed perhaps the biggest intellectual
threat to the New Deal conception of administrative law from the
1920s to the 1940s.121 It could be that for Stevens, who had grown up
and attended law school in the aftermath of the New Deal era, the ref-
erence to Pound’s famous book carried tremendous symbolism. But
maybe not. Regardless of whether he intended it, the effect of the foot-
note was that of a small victory flag concluding one of the nation’s
great debates during Pound’s time which had persisted until Stevens’
gavel fell: deference to agency interpretations of law is now the rule.
D. Chevron’s Shade
By the time Chevron was decided, Anne Gorsuch’s tenure at the
EPA had ended.122  Although her twenty-two month stint as Adminis-
trator was short, it was time enough to spark a reformation on
administrative power. The newly announced Chevron, as a simple two-
step formula, would become laden with nuance and added require-
119. Id. at 843, n.10.
120. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 174 (1921).
121. See POSTELL, supra note 77, at 231 (dissecting Pound’s “infamous 1938 ABA Re-
port” where he “denounced Roosevelt’s ‘administrative absolutism’” and claimed “[a] judicial
regime was being supplanted by an administrative regime”).
122. See BURFORD, supra note 1, at 217–18 (describing Anne’s meeting with Joe Coors R
where he, acting as the Reagan’s proxy, negotiated her resignation). Anne Gorsuch resigned
after Congress accused the EPA of mishandling money allocated for a Superfund to clean up
toxic waste sites.  Per Reagan’s direct order, Anne asserted executive privilege and refused
to turn over certain Superfund documentation to Congress, and was then held in contempt.
See id. at 101–110 for the background of the Superfund. See id. at 145–174 for Anne’s expla-
nation that her fall was the unfortunate consequence of a special project pursued by
presidential advisors who wished to strengthen executive privilege jurisprudence.  Although
Anne vehemently opposed using the EPA or the Superfund documents for this purpose, she
was ordered to comply by Reagan.
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ments,123 but its impact on America’s constitutional system of
government and the American economy would become massive.124
Since Chevron took the first definitive step toward deference to
agency interpretations of law, derivative cases have followed in its
wake which provide agencies even greater power within our “constitu-
tional” system.  Among these, one in particular is important for
understanding the limits to Scalia’s deference to agencies. In National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services (Brand
X), Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, where Chevron deference
is applicable due to ambiguity in a statute, an agency is not required to
follow the Court’s interpretation of the statute.125 In other words, in
situations in which the Court interprets an ambiguous statute before
an agency has made an interpretive ruling on the same statute, the
agency is not bound by the Court’s interpretation.
Scalia thought this went too far. In his dissent, he wrote, “This
is not only bizarre. It is probably unconstitutional. . . . Article III courts
do not sit to render decision that can be reversed or ignored by Execu-
tive officers.”126 Scalia’s opinion, however, could not command a
majority.  Having long championed Chevron as a vital component of
the administrative state,127 he was unable to prevent it from spawning
doctrines that, by his lights, were “bizarre.”
123. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding the Court must
first inquire as to whether Congress had delegated interpretive authority to the agency
before administering Chevron deference); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (de-
ferring to the agency’s interpretation where it occurs in an amicus brief because “there is no
reason to suspect . . . [it] does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment”); Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (holding that interpretations first
made by the agency in the course of litigation to which it is a party are to not be afforded
deference).
124. See, e.g., The Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2017) (statement for the record of Karen R. Harned, Exec. Dir., NFIB Small Bus. Legal
Ctr.) (“For small businesses . . . [Chevron] has been quite problematic.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Law & Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (“Chevron
promises to be a pillar in administrative law for many years to come. It has become a kind of
Marbury, or counter-, for the administrative state.”).
125. 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court deci-
sion holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion. This principle follows from Chevron itself.”).
126. Id. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See PART III, SECTION B, supra.
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III. JUSTICE NEIL GORSUCH: CAREER & IDEOLOGY
Neil Gorsuch was sixteen years old when Chevron was an-
nounced.128 Thirty-two years later, he was confirmed by the Senate to
be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.129 As mentioned before,
some have compared Gorsuch’s jurisprudence to Scalia’s by noting that
“the exception [between them] . . . is Chevron.”130 While there might be
more hyperbole than truth in that statement, it serves to at least high-
light a noticeable and significant difference between the two judges.
Therefore, by diagramming Gorsuch’s views on Chevron, especially
those expressed during the 2016 presidential election cycle in which
the vacancy he filled was a—if not the—central determining factor, one
might gain some understanding of the current political will regarding
the doctrine.
The first section will briefly discuss Gorsuch’s background with
an eye toward the ways in which his conservative ideology was shaped.
The second section will delve into the first of two of Gorsuch’s recent
Circuit Court opinions dealing with Chevron, examining how his per-
sonal experiences with bureaucracies could inform his propensities as
a judge in ways that differ from Scalia. The last section examines Gor-
such’s most recent and controversial opinion discussing Chevron and
closely compares his arguments against deference to agency interpre-
tations of law to those previously put forth in favor of such deference by
Justice Scalia.
A. Son, Student, Federalist
Neil Gorsuch was the eldest son of two lawyers.131 Family life in
the Gorsuch household involved healthy portions of debate and policy
discussions, and the children were trained early to see and make both
sides of an argument.132 After knocking on doors to help his mother
win a seat in the Colorado legislature, he and his siblings moved to
D.C. with her when she got the call from President Reagan to run the
128. See Neil Gorsuch Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019 4:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/02/03/us/neil-gorsuch-fast-facts/index.html.
129. See Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate As Su-
preme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/
politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html.
130. See Justice Gorsuch Hearing, supra note 4.
131. See Kimberly Kindi et al., Simply Stated, Gorsuch Is Steadfast and Surprising,
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/gorsuch-pro
file/.
132. See id.
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EPA.133 His parents had recently divorced, and because his two
younger siblings returned to Colorado for school,134 fourteen year-old
Neil became his mother’s nearest family member during her conten-
tious tenure.135 Described by his mother as possessing an “unerring
sense of fairness” and being “smart as a whip,” young Gorsuch was
“very upset” when his mother was forced to resign from the EPA.136 In
her memoir, Anne recounts his reaction when she told him about her
resignation over the phone:
“You should not have resigned,” [Gorsuch] said [to his mother]
firmly.  “You didn’t do anything wrong. You only did what the Presi-
dent ordered.  Why are you quitting?  You raised me not to be a
quitter.  Why are you a quitter?”
“Honey, relax.  It isn’t everything it appears to be.  I can’t explain it
all to you now, but don’t be upset.  There are other things going on
that I will tell you about when I see you.  I’m just fine.”137
However Anne was able to explain the situation at a later time, Gor-
such’s first up-close-and-personal experience with a federal
bureaucracy certainly did not end well.
Being the son of the powerful D.C. figure had its perks, though,
and Gorsuch was able to attend a prestigious D.C. prep school.138 Early
on, Gorsuch exhibited ambition and a knack for politics, and as a Jun-
ior at Georgetown Prep he sought election for student body
President.139 Gorsuch also earned the respect of his classmates for his
intellect and debate skills, and, in spite of his mother’s trouble at the
EPA, “[h]e was known as an especially fierce champion of Reagan and
the Republican agenda.”140
Once at Columbia for college, his conservatism became even
more noticeable, perhaps by contrast.  While running for a student
Senate position, Gorsuch was asked, along with the other candidates,
whether the Marines should be allowed to recruit on campus.141 His
133. See id.
134. See BURFORD, supra note 1, at 225 (“Stephanie and J.J. . . . were out in Denver R
finishing the school year.”).
135. See Frank & Matthews, supra note 20 (“Neil Gorsuch had a front-row seat for his
mother’s term as a student at Georgetown Prep.”).
136. BURFORD, supra note 1, at 225. R
137. Id.
138. See Kindi et al., supra note 131 (“At Georgetown [Prep] . . . he swapped the polo
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competitors argued that the military’s discrimination against gays was
problematic, but Gorsuch reframed the issue by invoking the First
Amendment: “[t]he question here is not whether ‘the Marines should
be allowed to recruit on campus’ but whether a University and its com-
munity . . . has the right or obligation to determine who may speak on
campus or what may be said.”142 In spite of his keen eye for turning
arguments, Gorsuch would go on to be disqualified from the election
due to a technicality: he had broken school postering rules.143 Follow-
ing in his mother’s footsteps, then, Gorsuch fell prey to a bureaucracy.
Later, while writing for a conservative periodical called The Federalist
he had started on campus with some classmates, Gorsuch alluded to
his rift with the Columbia campaign rule makers: “Columbia College
election rules are a swamp of bureaucratic pettiness, unequaled even
by the federal government. They are confusing, often unduly severe,
and clearly in need of reform.  Some candidates in this election may
have manipulated them for personal gain.”144
Here, in the aftermath of his mother’s fallout at the EPA, in
both the Marine Corps debate and the campaign poster debacle, Gor-
such’s budding views towards bureaucratic power are noteworthy.
These small but salient encounters with rulemaking bodies, before he
attended Harvard Law School, earned his Doctor of Philosophy from
Oxford, or became a Tenth Circuit judge,145 show he had already devel-
oped a sharp sense of how constraints on power are to be applied and a
personal distaste for pettiness and abuses of power in bureaucratic
bodies.
B. The Judge & His Opinions
As a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch was willing to debate
the scope, wisdom, and constitutionality of Chevron deference to
agency interpretations of law. In two very recent opinions, Gorsuch ar-
dently challenged the Brand X strain of Chevron deference, working to
limit some of the most extreme consequences of the doctrine in the
142. Id.
143. Amy Wang, What Neil Gorsuch’s Old College Newspaper Columns Say about Him,




145. Neil Gorsuch Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019 4:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/
02/03/us/neil-gorsuch-fast-facts/index.html.
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Tenth Circuit.146 While doing so, Gorsuch went even further, question-
ing Chevron generally and raising significant counterarguments to
Scalia’s core justifications for the doctrine.
In De Niz Robles v. Lynch, Gorsuch addressed whether an
agency’s statutory interpretation may be applied retroactively to de-
prive an illegal alien the opportunity to apply for lawful residency.147
Previously, the Tenth Circuit had conceded that, under Brand X, they
must allow the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to overrule the
court’s prior decision regarding an important policy decision.148 Con-
gress had enacted two conflicting statutes affecting persons who enter
the country illegally: one saying the Attorney General may grant them
lawful residency,149 and another mandating their automatic re-
moval.150 In Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzalez (Padilla–Caldera I), the
Tenth Circuit resolved the impasse, stating that the statute providing
the Attorney General power to grant lawful residency should gov-
ern.151 Four years later, however, in In re Briones, the BIA reversed
the Tenth Circuit’s opinion by declaring the statute mandating auto-
matic removal should control.152 Not long thereafter, the Tenth Circuit
gave the BIA’s choice a Brand X stamp of approval in Padilla-Caldera
v. Holder (Padilla–Caldera II).153
But that was hardly the end of it.  During the interim between
Padilla–Caldera I and Briones, Mr. De Niz Robles—an illegal alien—
relied on the Tenth Circuit’s decision and applied for lawful resi-
dency.154 But because the BIA was somehow unable to address his
application for four years, they decided their ruling in Briones should
apply—not the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Padilla–Caldera I.155 In
other words, Mr. De Niz Robles was precluded from applying for lawful
residency because the BIA changed the law and applied it to him retro-
actively, as if their interpretation had been in place at the time of his
application.
146. See De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015); Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
147. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167.
148. Id.
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A) (2011).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2013).
151. Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-Caldera I), 426 F.3d 1294, 1300–01 (10th Cir.
2005), amended and superseded on reh’g 453 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006).
152. Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 371 (2007).
153. Padilla–Caldera v. Holder (Padilla-Caldera II), 637 F.3d 1140, 1153 (10th Cir.
2011).
154. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1168.
155. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\13-1\FAM103.txt unknown Seq: 28  7-AUG-19 14:36
72 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 13:1:45
Gorsuch was incensed. While grudgingly acknowledging that
Chevron and Brand X meant “there are indeed some occasions when a
federal bureaucracy can effectively overrule a judicial decision,” he
questioned whether the BIA may lawfully “impose new legal conse-
quences on Mr. De Niz Robles’s past conduct.”156 Concluding it could
not, Gorsuch first drew a fundamental distinction between legislative
power which is presumptively prospective and judicial power which
may be retroactive, relying on longstanding principles of law,157 the in-
herent meaning of “legislative Powers” in the Constitution,158 and due
process (fair notice) and equal protection concerns.159
Applying this binary of prospective and retroactive power to an
Executive agency with delegated rulemaking power, such as the BIA,
Gorsuch first pondered whether “Chevron step two muddles the sepa-
ration of powers by delegating to the Executive the power to legislate
generally applicable rules of private conduct,” and then, whether “the
combination of Chevron and Brand X further muddles the muddle by
intruding on the judicial function too.”160 Leaving these questions
looming, Gorsuch resigned that, “as but a court of appeals Chevron and
Brand X bind us and the question is what to do in light of them.”161
Feeling constrained by the higher court,162 then, Gorsuch relied not on
“the separation of powers . . . [to] forbid this form of decision-making
outright,” but rather, “second-order constitutional protections sound-
ing in due process and equal protection, as embodied in our
longstanding traditions and precedents addressing retroactivity in the
law.”163 Accordingly, he concluded that
[t]he presumption of prospectivity attaches to Congress’s own work
unless it plainly indicates an intention to act retroactively. That
same presumption, we think, should attach when Congress’s dele-
gates seek to exercise delegated legislative policymaking authority:
156. Id. at 1167–68.
157. See id. at 1169. (“[T]he presumption that legislation operates only prospectively is
nearly as old as the common law.” (citing 3 HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUE-
TUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 530–31 (Travers Twiss ed. & trans., 1880) (1257))).
158. Id.
159. See De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1170–71 (“[T]he Constitution has sought to mitigate
the due process and equal protection concerns associated with retroactive decision making
in other ways, by rules circumscribing the nature of the judicial function and the judicial
actor.”).
160. Id. at 1171.
161. Id.
162. Note that Gorsuch’s phrasing implies that it is his court’s relative power, not the
fact of Chevron’s precedent or established doctrine, that constrains him.
163. Des Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1171–72.
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their rules too should be presumed prospective in operation unless
Congress has clearly authorized retroactive application.164
In other words, the court should presume Congress intended to give
only what it actually possessed. At first glance, this appears to align
with Scalia’s primary argument for Chevron deference: presumed con-
gressional intent.165 As well, here, presuming Congress has delegated
only prospective rulemaking power provides Congress with tremen-
dous certainty when writing laws and allows the court to cobble
together the semblance of a coherent legal principle. However, notice-
ably different from Scalia’s justification is the way in which the
presumption functions: Gorsuch uses Congress’s presumed intent to
limit, rather than sanction, agency power.  This distinction is signifi-
cant because of the nature of a judicial presumption: an assumption
requiring no further proof. As applied to an executive agency, requiring
no further proof to allow an exertion of power is fundamentally differ-
ent than requiring no further proof to prohibit that same exertion of
power. In the former, there is a basic trust that the power will be used
appropriately or restrained in other ways (like the political process),
but in the latter there is a core distrust that the power will be used
appropriately or properly restrained.
C. In The Mold
This core distrust seems to animate Gorsuch’s views towards
bureaucratic power that is both extralegal and supralegal in nature.
His most significant challenge to Chevron came in 2016, when he au-
thored an opinion and a separate concurrence in a case with a fact
pattern nearly identical to De Niz Robles.166 In Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, an illegal alien applied for lawful residence in reliance on the
Padilla–Caldera I  holding where the Tenth Circuit chose between two
conflicting laws to afford the Attorney General discretion to approve
applications for lawful residence.167 Unlike the plaintiff in De Niz Ro-
bles, however, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for lawful residence after
the BIA’s ruling in Briones, which had excluded applications for lawful
residence by illegal aliens by choosing the other of the conflicting stat-
utes the court had weighed in Padilla–Caldera I.168 Nevertheless, Mr.
Gutierrez-Brizuela applied before the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Pa-
164. Id. at 1172.
165. See PART III, SECTION B, supra.
166. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144–45.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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dilla–Caldera II, which had approved of the BIA’s decision in Briones
under Chevron and Brand X deference.169
The question for Gorsuch this time, then, was whether the
BIA’s Briones ruling governed before it had been approved by the court
in Padilla–Caldera II. Gorsuch found it most certainly did not.170 Rely-
ing on the same principle he expounded in De Niz Robles—that
Congress’s presumed intent is to limit agencies to the same powers of
prospective legislation to which they are usually limited—Gorsuch
drew the BIA’s attention to an obviously ignored footnote in the De Niz
Robles opinion, reiterating that, “[u]ntil this court handed down Pa-
dilla–Caldera II . . . Padilla–Caldera I remained on the books as
binding precedent in the Tenth Circuit on which litigants were free
(and expected) to rely, and Briones bore no legal force.”171 In other
words, once the court has ruled on a statutory ambiguity, its precedent
governs—not the Agency’s contrary policy—until the Agency’s con-
trary policy is given Brand X deference by the court.  If this were not
so, he reasoned, “[i]t would . . . require the people to substitute reliance
on judicial declarations of what the law is with finely grained legal
judgments about the degree of ambiguity in the relevant statutory pro-
visions and the reasonableness of agency pronouncements about
them.”172 That is to say, allowing agency interpretations to govern
before courts apply Brand X and Chevron would make the law an un-
certain thing, depriving citizens of due process (fair notice).  Thus,
Gorsuch held that the court, and not the Agency, remained the gate-
keeper of binding precedent.173
But Gorsuch did not end there. Compelled by some instinct to
carry his momentum into a separate concurrence, Gorsuch started the
next section with a small bang:
There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously
attempted to work our way around it and even left it unremarked.
But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucra-
cies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power
and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1145 (“The BIA suggests this factual distinction makes all the legal dif-
ference. But we fail to see how.”).
171. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1145; See also De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1174 n.7
(“An agency in the Chevron step two/Brand X scenario may enforce its new policy judgment
only with judicial approval. So, for example, the BIA depended on Padilla–Caldera II to
render Briones effective.”).
172. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1147.
173. See id. (“[P]eople are entitled to rely on judicial precedents as definitive interpreta-
tions of what the law is so long as those precedents remain on the books.” (citing U.S.
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994))) (emphasis added).
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little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ de-
sign. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.174
Immediately, Gorsuch’s willingness to challenge Chevron should be ap-
preciated for its significance to him personally. Here, in Gorsuch’s
theoretical “room”—where one could likely hear a pin drop—behind
the “behemoth” Gorsuch is ready to face, stood both his mother and
predecessor, that is, his real and ideological family. But even their
presence behind Chevron is merely representative of larger, longer-
running arguments about the way in which power is to be divided in
order for people to be governed.175
The enormity of the moment was not lost on Gorsuch. He did
not begin his argument with a discussion of the Chevron case itself, but
by reaching further back into history:
In enlightenment theory and hard won experience under a
tyrannical king the founders found proof of the wisdom of a govern-
ment of separated powers. In the avowedly political legislature, the
framers endowed the people’s representatives with the authority to
prescribe new rules of general applicability prospectively. In the ex-
ecutive, they placed the task of ensuring the legislature’s rules are
faithfully executed in the hands of a single person also responsive
to the people. And in the judiciary, they charged individuals insu-
lated from political pressures with the job of interpreting the law
and applying it retroactively to resolve past disputes. This alloca-
tion of different sorts of power to different sorts of decision-makers
was no accident. To adapt the law to changing circumstances, the
founders thought, the collective wisdom of the people’s representa-
tives is needed. To faithfully execute the laws often demands the
sort of vigor hard to find in management-by-committee. And to re-
solve cases and controversies over past events calls for neutral
decision-makers who will apply the law as it is, not as they wish it
to be. Even more importantly, the founders considered the separa-
tion of powers a vital guard against governmental encroachment on
the people’s liberties . . . . A government of diffused powers, they
knew, is a government less capable of invading the liberties of the
people.176
The irony from the outset, then, is how Gorsuch based his argument
against Chevron in the very history his mother and Scalia, as ardent
conservatives and Originalists, would relish. Compare, for instance,
Scalia’s opening to his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, written around the
174. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
175. See discussion supra Part III.A.
176. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“No political truth . . . stamped with the authority of more
enlightened patrons of liberty” than the separation of powers)).
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same time he gave his speech at Duke Law advocating the merits of
Chevron deference:
It is the proud boast of our democracy that we have “a gov-
ernment of laws and not of men.” Many Americans are familiar
with that phrase; not many know its derivation. It comes from Part
the First, Article XXX, of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 . . . .
. . . .
The Framers of the Federal Constitution similarly viewed
the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guar-
antee of a just Government. In No. 47 of The Federalist, Madison
wrote that “[n]o political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value,
or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of lib-
erty.” Without a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of
Rights would be worthless, as are the bills of rights of many nations
of the world that have adopted, or even improved upon, the mere
words of ours.177
With such consensus on these core principles, one wonders why and
how Gorsuch and Scalia could differ so dramatically on the issue of
deference to agency interpretations of law.
D. The Exception
From Gutierrez-Brizuela, two main areas of disagreement be-
tween Gorsuch and Scalia emerge regarding deference under Chevron.
First, and perhaps most powerfully, Gorsuch challenges Scalia’s logic
regarding the purpose of Chevron: congressional intent to delegate in-
terpretive authority to agencies. Second, Gorsuch rejects Scalia’s
arguments regarding the effects of Chevron, both because of the way in
which it sanctions a delegation of legislative power to agencies and the
lack of institutional restraints in agency exercises of power.
Regarding the putative purpose of Chevron as a means to facili-
tate congressional intent, Gorsuch finds Congress’s contrary intent on
the subject to be clearly outlined in the Administrative Procedural Act,
stating that “Congress vested the courts with the power to ‘interpret
. . . statutory provisions’ and overturn agency action inconsistent with
those interpretations.”178 Scalia, on the other hand, believed Congress
had gotten it wrong in the APA, and accordingly discarded the clear
mandate for de novo review of agency interpretations of law without
177. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)).
178. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (2011)).
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further justification or a burdened conscience.179 Even if Scalia was
right about the prudence of Congress’s decision, however, Gorsuch sub-
mits that “legislative assignments like [the APA] are [themselves]
often constitutionally compelled.”180 From the outset, then, Gorsuch’s
textualism seems even more unyielding than that of the person
credited for popularizing the interpretational method.181
Turning then to Scalia’s principal argument, that courts should
presume congressional intent as a means for a stable background rule
for Congress to legislate, Gorsuch counters by observing that:
Transferring the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to
the executive unsurprisingly invites . . . due process (fair notice)
and equal protection concerns the framers knew would arise if the
political branches intruded on judicial functions.  Under Chevron
the people aren’t just charged with awareness of and the duty to
conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a de-
tached magistrate can muster.  Instead, they are charged with an
awareness of Chevron; required to guess whether the statute will be
declared “ambiguous” (courts often disagree on what qualifies); and
required to guess (again) whether an agency’s interpretation will be
deemed “reasonable.”  Who can even attempt all that, at least with-
out an army of perfumed lawyers and lobbyists? And, of course,
that’s not the end of it. Even if the people somehow manage to make
it through this far unscathed, they must always remain alert to the
possibility that the agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees
anytime based merely on the shift of political winds and still pre-
vail. . . . Perhaps allowing agencies rather than courts to declare the
law’s meaning bears some advantages, but it also bears its costs.
And the founders were wary of those costs, knowing that, when un-
checked by independent courts exercising the job of declaring the
law’s meaning, executives throughout history had sought to exploit
ambiguous laws as license for their own prerogative.182
In other words, any stabilizing benefit interpretational deference af-
fords Congress is obtained at the expense of a destabilizing effect upon
the people. Taken seriously, Gorsuch’s logic echoes a more fundamen-
tal (and timeless) question: is the government for the people, or are the
people for the government?
179. See Judicial Deference, supra note 14, at 514 (“[T]he [APA] itself seems to have
been based upon the quite mistaken assumption that questions of law would always be
decided de novo by the courts.”).
180. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
181. See Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch, 2016 Summer Canary Memorial Lecture: Of Lions
and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 905, 906 (2016) (arguing “there can be little doubt about the success of [Scalia’s textu-
alism] project”).
182. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 287-91 (2014)).
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Next, stepping back to address a threshold matter, Gorsuch ar-
gues that focus on the Congress-agency dynamic is misplaced: “[f]or
whatever the agency may be doing under Chevron, the problem re-
mains that courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret the law.”183
This, Gorsuch believes, is a “problem for the people whose liberties
may now be impaired not by an independent decision-maker . . . prom-
ised to them by law . . . but by an avowedly politicized administrative
agent . . . pursu[ing] whatever policy whim may rule the day.”184 In
other words, however valid the merits of Scalia’s presumed delegation
of interpretational power analysis, the courts should not abdicate their
role as judges.185 Gorsuch concedes that “some role remains for judges
even under Chevron,” but wonders “where in [the two-step process]
does a court interpret the law and say what it is? When does a court
independently decide what the statute means and whether it has or
has not vested a legal right in a person?”186 Unable to find suitable
answers, he concludes that “[w]here Chevron applies that job seems to
have gone extinct.”187
Not thinking the “elephant” sufficiently addressed,188 Gorsuch
collapses his previous arguments regarding the APA and judicial abdi-
cation of duty while squarely facing the prudence of Scalia’s concession
that presumed congressional intent is “fiction[al]”189:
Chevron’s inference about hidden congressional intentions seems
belied by the intentions Congress has made textually manifest. . . .
[H]ow can anyone fairly say that Congress “intended” for courts to
abdicate their statutory duty under § 706 and instead “intended” to
delegate away its legislative power to executive agencies? The fact
is, Chevron’s claim about legislative intentions is no more than a
fiction—and one that requires a pretty hefty suspension of disbelief
at that.190
Without saying it directly, Gorsuch seems to imply that Scalia’s princi-
pal justification for Chevron is, in essence, nonsensical.
Showing himself unrelenting, Gorsuch goes on to address the
effects of Chevron deference. First, he argues that such interpreta-
tional deference could itself be a violation of the nondelegation
183. Id. 1152–53.
184. Id. at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 1152 (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication
of the judicial duty.”).
186. Id.
187. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152.
188. Id. at 1149.
189. Id. at 1153.
190. Id. at 1152, 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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doctrine.191 He points out that, in spite of the sometimes “murky” line
between executive and legislative functions, the only traditionally
valid delegations of Congress’s powers to the executive were for “fac-
tual findings” and “to resolve ‘details’ (like, say, the design of an
appropriate tax stamp).”192 And because “Chevron pretty clearly in-
volves neither of these kinds of executive functions [it,] . . . as a
historical matter, appears instead to qualify as a violation of the sepa-
ration of powers.”193 Admitting, however, that “in relatively recent
times the Court has relaxed its approach to claims of unlawful legisla-
tive delegation” through the intelligible principle doctrine, Gorsuch
nevertheless contends that “it’s no small question whether Chevron
can clear it.”194
In analyzing Chevron’s validity under the intelligent principle
doctrine, Gorsuch borrows from—unsurprisingly at this point—
Scalia’s elucidation of the doctrine in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’n.195 Addressing Scalia’s “substantial guidance” requirement for
“setting . . .  standards that affect the entire national economy,” Gor-
such questions whether there is “substantial guidance” when “an
agency can enact a new rule of general applicability affecting huge
swaths of the national economy one day and reverse itself the next,”
such as the Court did in the Chevron opinion itself by deferring to the
agency after it had reversed course on its interpretation of the Clean
Air Act.196 Further, he questions whether an agency has been given a
“clearly delineated boundary” when it “can interpret the scope of its
statutory jurisdiction one way one day and reverse itself the next,”
pointing out “that is exactly what [Justice Scalia’s] City of Arlington’s
application of Chevron says it can [do] . . . .”197
Finally, Gorsuch questions the notion that executive agencies
are sufficiently subject to the President to be institutionally restrained
in their exercise of power, noting that agencies “often receive little ef-
fective oversight from the chief executive to whom they nominally
191. Id. at 1153–54.
192. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1154.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989)).
195. Id. (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001)).
196. Id. 1154 (noting “that is exactly what Chevron permits, see [Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857–59 (1984)]”).
197. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1154 (citing City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 569 U.S.
290, 300 (“[T]he scope of agencies’ regulatory jurisdiction . . . [is a] question[ ] to which the
Chevron framework applies.”)); cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704–05 (1988) (“[W]here
the issue pertains to separation of powers, and the political branches are (as here) in disa-
greement, neither can be presumed correct.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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report.”198 This argument directly touches something upon which
Scalia conditioned delegation when he stated that “[i]f Congress is to
delegate broadly . . . continuing political accountability [should] be as-
sured[ ] through direct political pressures upon the Executive . . . .”199
What is important to notice here is that Gorsuch does not necessarily
disagree with Scalia’s theoretical argument—that political pressure on
a unitary executive is best for reigning in governmental agencies—but
rather, Gorsuch demonstrates a realism in acknowledging how the ad-
ministrative state, in practice, evades presidential control.200
In summary, Gorsuch challenges Scalia’s justifications for the
Chevron doctrine by first attacking the purpose of interpretational def-
erence, noting that Congress’s intent on the subject has been clearly
delineated in the APA, deference to agencies creates uncertainty for
the people, and the Founders’ intent regarding the judiciary’s role in
interpretations of law is sufficiently prescribed in the Constitution’s
design.201 Gorsuch then notes additional negative effects of Chevron on
the law by observing that it may fail the nondelegation doctrine and it
is irrational to think agencies are politically constrained under presi-
dential control.202
After reaching the end of his concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela,
Gorsuch appeared to recognize the cogency of his arguments, and won-
dered aloud what would happen “[i]f this goliath of modern
administrative law were to fall?”203 The only difference,” he opined,
“would be that courts would then fulfill their duty to exercise their in-
dependent judgment about what the law is,” which would “avoid the
due process and equal protection problems” and “promote reliance in-
terests by allowing citizens to organize their affairs with some
assurance that the rug will not be pulled from under them tomorrow,
the next day, or after the next election.”204 In other words, with a mem-
ory of the world before Chevron, “very little would change—except
perhaps the most important things.”205
198. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1155 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
199. Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 518.
200. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1155 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 1146-48.
202. Id. at 1152-55 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 1158.
204. Id. (emphasis omitted).
205. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1158.
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CONCLUSION
Three months before Gorsuch authored Gutierrez-Brizuela,
then-presidential candidate Donald Trump released eleven potential
names to fill Scalia’s vacancy on the Supreme Court—and Gorsuch did
not make the list.206 But in September, exactly one month after the
Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence, Trump updated the list to include Gor-
such.207 These facts alone are insufficient to establish a causal
connection between the Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence and Gorsuch’s
ultimate appointment, but they are nonetheless intriguing—especially
in light of Gorsuch’s family history and Trump’s promise to select a
justice “in the mold” of Antonin Scalia.208 Regardless, Chevron is gain-
ing negative attention recently, especially from the right side of the
aisle.209 But why?
Arriving at a definitive causation for the growing disfavor of an
esoteric doctrine as encompassing and controversial as Chevron is per-
haps too large a question for one Comment, but Gorsuch’s concurrence
206. Ginger Gibson & Lawrence Hurley, Trump Identifies 11 Potential Supreme Court
Nominees, REUTERS (May 28, 2016, 2:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-elec
tion-trump-court/trump-identifies-11-potential-supreme-court-nominees-idUSKCN0Y92K5.
207. Christian Farias, Donald Trump Expands His Supreme Court Wish List, Because
Nothing Matters, HUFFPOST (Sept. 23, 2016, 9:54 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/trump-second-supreme-court-wishlist_us_57e52004e4b08d73b830ad81.
208. Jonathan Adler, How Scalia-esque Will Donald Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee
Be?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/how-scalia-esque-will-donald-trumps-supreme-
court-nominee-be/?utm_term=.9f58cc8bf69d. As well, the relevance of Gorsuch’s position on
Chevron to his appointment was further heightened after the appointment of Justice Kava-
naugh, who similarly expressed disdain for the doctrine prior to his nomination. See Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154 (2016) (re-
viewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014) (“[The Chevron] doctrine is
“indeterminate — and thus can be antithetical to the neutral, impartial rule of law — be-
cause of the initial clarity versus ambiguity decision.”); see also Ed Whalen, Judge
Kavanaugh’s Record Against the Administrative State, NATIONAL REVIEW (July 4, 2018),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/judge-kavanaughs-record-against-the-admin
istrative-state/?fbclid=IwAR3MNcovch2wwjQm5hZK4V6A6friR4iESeKi7ublfUZ5Ul8mHd0
MDEGQRaA (“Judge Kavanaugh is a strong critic of the Chevron principle of deference to
administrative agencies—both of the foundation of that principle and of the manner in
which it is often exercised.”).
209. See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (as
passed by House on Jan. 11, 2017) (modifying the “scope of judicial review of agency actions
to authorize courts reviewing agency actions to decide de novo (without giving deference to
the agency’s interpretation) all relevant questions of law”); see also Jack Beerman, End the
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overturned, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 784 (2010) (“Chevron encourages irresponsible agency
and judicial behavior. Agencies expecting that their interpretive decisions will be reviewed
under a deferential version of Chevron are free to disregard congressional intent and impose
their own policy views.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\13-1\FAM103.txt unknown Seq: 38  7-AUG-19 14:36
82 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 13:1:45
in Gutierrez-Brizuela seems to suggest a helpful launching point.  Re-
call that he writes:
Under Chevron the people aren’t just charged with awareness of
and the duty to conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the
law that a detached magistrate can muster.  Instead, they are
charged with an awareness of Chevron; required to guess whether
the statute will be declared “ambiguous” (courts often disagree on
what qualifies); and required to guess (again) whether an agency’s
interpretation will be deemed “reasonable.”  Who can even attempt
all that, at least without an army of perfumed lawyers and lobby-
ists? And, of course, that’s not the end of it. Even if the people
somehow manage to make it through this far unscathed, they must
always remain alert to the possibility that the agency will reverse
its current view 180 degrees anytime based merely on the shift of
political winds and still prevail.210
Here, Gorsuch is not speaking in ideological terms. Rather, he
is extrapolating the individual experience of a person before his court
to the broader public. Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela, like Mr. De Niz Robles
before him, fell prey to a bureaucratic entity whose power to enforce
law was coupled with the delegated power to define law. Without the
Tenth Circuit as a referee to draw a sharp distinction between prospec-
tive and retroactive rulemaking, both immigrants would have been out
of luck even though they had made a reasonable attempt to comply
with the law as it was written at the time they acted.
As extrapolated, then, Gorsuch’s critique of Chevron suggests
that experiences of uncertainty and disappointment at the hands of
federal bureaucracies could be common. Perhaps he assumes too much
in suggesting this without empirical support. But, then again, his focus
on the mechanics of Chevron—that is, the inherent unfairness of its
procedure—counsels that, here, the need for empiricism is minimal.
Law should be a predictable thing. Chevron makes it not so. Accord-
ingly, even if judicial review of agency interpretations is rare, one due
process violation such as Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela’s is too many. Fur-
thermore, with Chevron’s dominance over the last three decades, there
is no telling the number of challenges to agency interpretations of law
that would have been brought had a deference regime not been so
entrenched.
It is not difficult to imagine how such felt uncertainty, if scat-
tered across various socio-economic groups in the United States, might
lead voters to grow uneasy about the concentration of power in federal
agencies. Even if knowledge of Chevron deference remains a thing for
210. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted.).
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lawyers and academics, voters burned by or concerned over the unpre-
dictability of agency regulation might tend to side with candidates that
promise deregulation.211
But how did Reagan Revolutionaries like Anne Gorsuch and
Justice Scalia not see deference the same way Justice Gorsuch sees it?
For Anne and the Colorado Mafia, at least, the perceived pressing po-
litical needs of the moment seem to have made considerations such as
the long-term socio-legal effects of deference to agency interpretations
of law an oversight.212 For Scalia, whose jurisprudence seemed laser
focused on shifting unconstitutional discretion away from the bench,
any consideration of Chevron’s negative effects seems to have been
eclipsed by the opportunity it presented to remove from judges the
temptation to legislate—especially because he considered such judicial
legislation detrimental to the economy.213
With over three decades having passed since Chevron, the pro-
market impetus behind administrative deregulation that receives judi-
cial deference is also showing signs of irony. Most notably, small
businesses appear to be suffering from the effects of cronyism and im-
movable regulations.214 Mechanically, this makes sense: Chevron
provides tremendous incentive to corporate lobbyists to work alongside
agencies to pry ambiguity out of every statute and suggest interpreta-
tions that benefit them while causing market barrier-entries to
competition that are immune to judicial challenge.215 Large corpora-
211. This is especially intriguing in light of the Latin-American community’s surprising
support for President Donald Trump during the 2016 election, which bewildered many due
to accusations he did not hold Latin-Americans’ interests. See, e.g., Geraldo L. Cadava, Ru-
ral Hispanic Voters—Like White Rural Voters—Shifted Toward Trump. Here’s Why., WASH.
POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/17/
rural-hispanic-voters-like-white-rural-voters-shifted-toward-trump-heres-why/?utm_term=
.470832000ec5 (attributing the surprising support to “[o]ne answer: poverty”); see also Alan
Gomez, Another Election Surprise: Many Hispanics Backed Trump, USA TODAY (Nov. 9,
2016, 6:15 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/11/09/his
panic-vote-election-2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton/93540772/ (noting that Trump
earned 29% of the Hispanic vote while presidential-candidate Mitt Romney earned only 27%
during the 2012 election). This is not to suggest Chevron and Brand X fully explain such
voting, but rather that the impact of due process issues identified by Gorsuch and illus-
trated in cases such as Gutierrez-Brizuela might be one underlying factor for groups
particularly affected by deference to agencies.
212. See, e.g., Shabecoff, supra note 39; BURFORD, supra note 1, at 54.
213. Scalia, Regulatory Reform, supra note 90, at 13.
214. See The Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(2017) (statement for the record of Karen R. Harned, Exec. Dir., NFIB Small Bus. Legal
Ctr.) (“For small businesses . . . [Chevron] has been quite problematic.”).
215. See Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corpor
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tions are happy to spend some money to ensure regulatory compliance
so long as potential competitors are dissuaded from entering their mar-
ket.216 Kill the weeds. Bask in glorious light. Indeed, since 1987 (the
year after Scalia joined the court), young firms (less than five years
old) as a percentage of total firms have declined by 13%.217 In other
words, since Chevron became a thing, data suggests it is more difficult
to succeed as a new business.
Of course, the link between the decline in young firms and
Chevron might be merely coincidental, not causal. To strengthen it,
further research would be necessary, such as an inquiry into the types
of regulations lobbied for since Chevron and the percentage of times
courts defer to agencies when regulations that have an anti-competi-
tive effect are challenged. Furthermore, not everyone owns a small
business, therefore the political disfavor into which Chevron has
clearly fallen indicates the presence of additional factors above and be-
yond any correlation between Chevron and the difficulties faced by
young firms.
Another curious change is Chevron’s recent notoriety in Con-
gress,218 especially in light of Scalia’s preeminent justification for the
doctrine being that it gave Congress a stable background upon which
to legislate. If Chevron has caused or is perceived to have caused felt
uncertainty or damage to small business, perhaps this trend among
conservative lawmakers is merely political.  But it could also be insti-
tutional. It is easy to imagine the envy or frustration Congress might
feel as they compare their lawmaking power to that of agency adminis-
trators.  As long as the administrators play the game right (i.e. find
and exploit a statutory ambiguity in a reasonable manner), they func-
ate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822/ (arguing that, beginning in the
1980s, “rather than trying to keep government out of its business (as they did for a long
time), companies . . . increasingly bring[ ] government in as a partner, looking to see what
the country can do for them.”).
216. See John Shepherd Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 725 (1986) (“Government at virtually every level offers enormously lucrative
potential benefits (such as . . . entry-barrier protection against competition) to competing
producers.”).
217. John Haltiwanger et al., Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing: Where Have All
the Young Firms Gone? 3-4 (2012), https://www.census.gov/ces/pdf/BDS_StatBrief6_Young_
Firms.pdf; see also Jordan Weissman, The 30-Year Decline of American Entrepreneurship,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/the-
30-year-decline-of-american-entrepreneurship/262831/ (discussing the import of the decline
in entrepreneurship since the 1980s).
218. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Seige, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2017) (discussing the Senate and House versions of the Regulatory
Accountability Act, which would curtail deference to agencies and effectively eliminate
Chevron deference).
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tion with minimal accountability and relative ease.219 Of course,
Congress may always pass new statutes to alter or nullify regulation,
but that requires countless hours of oversight and efforts to build con-
sensus, a process exceedingly more difficult (especially in the current
polarized political climate) than informal rulemaking and adjudica-
tion.220 Furthermore, time has shown that agencies are often able to
accomplish the policy goals of a minority political party when Congress
fails to do so.221 With Chevron, any exploitation of statutory ambiguity
used to achieve policy aims where Congress specifically did not sanc-
tion a policy would be an undemocratic backup plan for the minority
that failed to enact a bill and a nuisance for the majority that voted
against it.  Moreover, it is possible that such actions undercut voters’
confidence in the efficacy of Congress as an institution.  Interestingly,
since 1986, Americans’ confidence in Congress has dropped steadily
and dramatically from 41% to 7% in 2014.222
The recent trend in Congress is especially noteworthy when
considering that, if Congress pulls the plug on Chevron deference, the
unmitigated power to interpret statutes de novo does not shift back to
them but to the Court. When the Reaganites assumed power, this ar-
219. Although it is traditionally argued that agencies are politically accountable as ex-
tensions of the Executive, this theory ignores historic difficulty of presidents to control
agency actions, and furthermore fails to see the question as a matter of relative incentive:
even if the President had perfect control, the Constitution does not contemplate persons
with rulemaking power held accountable vicariously by a vote upon a single individual
every four years. See POSTELL, supra note 77, at 247–48 (“FDR’s limited success in estab-
lishing presidential control over the administrative state . . . ensured that his successors
would be continually frustrated in their attempts to establish their priorities over the bu-
reaucracy.”); id. at 248 (“[C]ongress is . . . equipped to override presidential influence when
it wants to insulate an agency from presidential oversight, particularly after the
Humphrey’s Executor decision.”); id. at 250 (“Eventually Nixon abandoned regular meetings
with his domestic cabinet secretaries, as he found that they increasingly opposed him and
brought their own programmatic priorities to him for support.”).
220. From 1984 to 2015, the average number of Final Rules from agencies published per
year was about 4241; during the same period the average number of enacted laws from
Congress per year was only about 240 (99th through 114th Congresses). See Maeve P. Ca-
rey, Cong. Research Serv., R43056, Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking,
Types of Federal Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register 5–6 (2016); Statistics and
Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
statistics.
221. See, e.g., POSTELL, supra note 77, at 296 (“[A]lthough Congress failed to pass the
Lieberman/Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, which would have given the EPA power to
regulate greenhouse gases, this very objective was realized simply by interpreting the Clean
Air Act to have already given the agency that authority.”).
222. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-ins
titutions.aspx (last visited May, 5 2019), (showing the percentage of Americans who have
“Great Deal/Quite a lot” of confidence in Congress). The preceding thirteen years during
which data was collected indicate the previous low was 29%, with confidence levels gener-
ally around 40%. Id.
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rangement was antithetical to their policy aims. But rather than
travelling the hard road of pursuing deregulatory statutes, players
such as Anne Gorsuch and Scalia found an easier path in administra-
tive deregulation.
If agencies lose the authority to say what the law is and the
task returns fully to the courts, it is conceivable that lawmakers will
not like the policy decisions of courts, whose incentives are starkly dif-
ferent than the political branches, and over whom Congress has less
control. Accordingly, Congress may at last be forced to rethink the
quantum of decision-making power allocated to agencies which ends up
trickling into the judiciary.  In other words, if Chevron falls, Congress
may be incited to jealousy against the Court, and, recognizing that its
own positive enactments are the genesis of power ultimately seized by
its robed sibling, it may work to curtail that power by cutting it off at
the source.
In this way, Scalia’s zeal for judicial minimalism as applied to
administrative law might have prevented the tripartite system from
fully functioning. Had Scalia gone the other way, fighting to suppress
deference under Chevron and pushing for judicial oversight, it is at
least theoretically possible Reagan would have been forced to work
with Congress (not the federal bureaucracy) to accomplish his policy
aims. Without doubt this would have been more difficult than using
administrative deregulation, and his success would have made “Cra-
zies” out of Congressmen—that is, it may have drawn severe political
ire toward the Republican party.
Whether the reason for Chevron’s decline in popularity in con-
servative circles is due to feelings of instability among citizens and
residents, negative impacts on small businesses, institutional competi-
tion between Congress and the Executive, or a myriad of other
reasons,223 one thing is certain: the regulation-savvy Obama presi-
dency squeezed both political parties to settle their particular
allegiance regarding the doctrine.224 Perhaps more than anything else,
this explains the strength of the current shift—especially on the Court,
where at least Justices Roberts and Thomas have expressed strong dis-
223. See POSTELL, supra note 77, at 298 (suggesting the recent “reversion to Progres-
sive-era institutional patterns, in which progressives defend the executive and
conservatives defend judicial review of administrative decision making, is [either] a tempo-
rary response to a unique political configuration or a more permanent rethinking of the
constitutionality of the administrative state”).
224. See id. at 297 (“It was inevitable . . . that the inauguration of a more Progressive
president would test the allegiance of both sides to these institutional allegiances.”).
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like of the doctrine and a willingness to move past it.225  Nevertheless,
with a conservative majority in both the White House and Senate, only
time will tell whether the anti-Chevron rhetoric will amount to its de-
mise or lead to its full revival as a means for conservatives to continue
practicing administrative deregulation. And like before, a Gorsuch is
at the center—but this time holding a gavel.
225. See id. (describing the recent shift on the Roberts Court); see also Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (raising “serious questions about the
constitutionality of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal
statutes” under Chevron).
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